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ABSTRACT
The US Armed Forces officially desegregated in 1948. Over the following
70 years, the military has made great strides in promoting racial integra-
tion. We find evidence, however, that Black soldiers’ experience of military
service still differs significantly from that of other racial and ethnic groups.
Exploiting a database of administrative records for 100,000 Army person-
nel serving during the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, we find that
Blacks were less likely than other service members to have deployed, or
to face intense combat if deployed, during the early phases of the
campaigns.
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The end of overt segregation in the armed forces had not spelled the end of discrimination. The persistence of
subtle forms of racism in an otherwise completely integrated setting defines to this day the experience of blacks in
themilitary. Yet there is no question that on the whole themilitary has served blacks well, just as blacks have served
the military well. The story of blacks in the military is instructive. So is the fact that it has received little attention.
Charles Moskos1
Introduction
On 26 July 1948, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981, which committed the government both
to the physical desegregation of the Armed Forces, as well as the equalization of opportunities and
treatment for Blacks and Whites who serve in uniform. Since then, the US military has made huge strides.
Nothing more vividly illustrates this than the ascension of Colin Powell to the Chairmanship of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1989, only 40 years after EO 9981.
Since Vietnam, Blacks have been over-represented in the US military and they have served dispropor-
tionately in non-combat roles.2 This is widely assumed to be the result of economic considerations, since
there is evidence – reviewed later in this paper – that Black veterans enjoy higher lifetime incomes than
Blacks who never served. In addressing how this affects career choices that Blacks make during their
military service, Clarence Johnson, the current director of the Pentagon’s Office of Diversity Management,
recounts that:
Kids I’ve spoken to, who choose to do supply, who choose to do lawyer, who choose to do admin, have the impression
that ‘If I go to Army and become an infantry person, that is not a skill that I can carry to the civilian work force.’ Young
black officers choose other fields because theywant to prepare for a future outside of themilitary, and they believe that
being in communications, being in logistics will provide them a better opportunity to succeed. 3
In this paper, we find evidence that differences between Blacks and other service members in the
U.S. military are far deeper than heretofore understood. When compared to members of other racial or
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ethnic groups, Blacks – whether assigned to combat or non-combat roles – were far less likely to serve in
units that were deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq during the initial phases of these campaigns.
We also find evidence that Blacks who served in deployed units were more likely to be left behind
and not accompany their comrades, and that Blacks who did deploy with their units were less likely
to be serving in units that would experience intense combat. Finally, Blacks were more likely to be
excluded from deployment due to disciplinary problems.
As a whole, the portrait that emerges is that of a racial minority whose experience of, and
motivation for, military services – 70 years after EO 9981 – diverges radically from that of all other
identifiable American ethnic and racial groups.
This paper has seven sections. In Section Two, we describe the relevant literature. In Section
Three, we describe the data used in this paper. In Section Four, we report the results of logit analyses
that demonstrate considerable racial selection in deployment. In Section Five, we use bivariate probit
to consider whether this selection bias took place within or between units. In Section Six, we
consider the implications and drivers of our findings. Section Seven concludes the paper.
Literature
More than 2.5 million Americans served overseas in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Those young men and women will carry their experiences of war
with them for the rest of their lives, and it will affect them and their families – potentially in ways that
require a policy response. As a result, there has been considerable research interest in identifying the
impact of service in OEF and OIF on the veterans of those conflicts.
The challenge in doing such research has always been to differentiate between effects that are
caused by participation in the military and effects that are caused by fundamental differences in
personality and character that lead some people to serve in the military while others avoid service.
One approach, first articulated in Angrist’s seminal 1990 paper, uses the birthdates of those
drafted in WWII and the Vietnam War as an instrument for military service. Other papers that have
exploited this strategy include Angrist (1990), Angrist and Krueger (1994), Dobkin and Shabani
(2009), Rohlfs (2010), and Angrist and Chen (2011). This approach, however, cannot really shed
light on the impact of military service and combat on volunteers, nor can it differentiate between the
impacts on service members who actually participated in combat as opposed to those who served in
non-combats roles. Hence, the results of such studies may provide little insight on what we can
expect to see amongst the veterans of OEF/OIF.
An emerging line of research has pursued alternative approaches in order to study the specific
impact of deployment and combat on OEF/OIF veterans – all of whom were volunteers. A number of
these recent papers – Engel, Gallagher, and Lyle (2010), Shen et al. (2010), Cesur, Sabia, and Tekin
(2013), Edwards (2015) and Armey and Lipow (2015) – have sought to explain the impact of OEF/OIF
deployment on veterans’mental health, interest in higher education, and the school performance of
their children.
The earliest papers in this literature assume that for those who already serve, deployment is
exogenous since individuals neither choose nor are chosen to deploy. Rather, entire units are chosen,
and individuals are deployed if they have been assigned to those units. If individuals have little
control over their unit assignment, and no control of the deployments of their assigned units,
researchers could treat deployment as a kind of natural experiment among military personnel and
compare life outcomes between those who deployed and those who did not after adjusting for other
observable personal characteristics.
More recent papers, however – including Edwards (2015), Engel, Gallagher, and Lyle (2010), Cesur
and Sabia (2016), Cunha, Shen, and Burke (2017), Carter, Smith, and Wojtaszek (2017), and Armey
(2018) – have offered evidence that, despite this absence of individual control over assignments and
unit deployment, individual deployment may nevertheless be non-random in a number of ways.
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In this paper, we investigate the drivers of this non-random selection, and we consider many
possible sources of bias in selection for deployment. What we find is a large, highly significant, and
robust degree of selection bias.
Data
In this paper, we examine the cohort of male enlisted members of the US Army who volunteered for
service prior to September 2001 but had yet to complete their first term of service by March 2003,
when Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced. The data for this study is drawn from comprehensive
administrative records of enlisted personnel housed at the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC).
We focus on males because those in combat roles faced far more intense combat and these roles
were closed to women during the time frame being analyzed. By focusing on this cohort, we
eliminate any possibility that attitudes towards 9/11, the justifications for the invasion of Iraq, or
the prospect of imminent combat deployment could have influenced volunteers’ decisions to serve
in the armed forces. We also focus on first-term enlistees so as not to conflate deployment prob-
ability and the choice to reenlist.
As a check of the robustness of our findings, we examined the cohort of those who volunteered
for the US Army between January 2002 and December 2005.4 This group is made up of recruits who
understood that enlistment was likely to result in deployment to Afghanistan and/or Iraq, and
inevitable exposure to combat. As an additional test of robustness, we examined the cohort of
those who had volunteered for service in the US Marine Corps prior to 9/11 but where still in their
first term of service in March 2003.
Our analysis considers several possible drivers of non-random selection for deployment. These are
described in Table 1. For our dependent variables, we determine whether someone was deployed to
Iraq or Afghanistan at least once during their first term of service. The individuals in our sample were
primarily deployed in 2002–2004. We also include mortality information from DMDC data on
individuals’ OEF/OIF deployments. We use unit (company) level data on monthly deaths and other
casualties – which includes information as to whether the casualties were due to hostile action – to
calculate whether hostile deaths were sustained by each individual’s unit during his deployment. We




Deployed 1,0 Value of 1 if service member was deployed during first term
Unit Mortality 1,0 Value of 1 if unit experienced a fatality while service member was deployed
AFQT 1-98 Percentile score on AFQT
Age 17-35 Age in September 2001
Married 1,0 Value of 1 if married as of September 2001
Children 1,0 Value of 1 if service member had children as of September 2001
Black 1,0 Value of 1 if self identifies as Black
Hispanic 1,0 Value of 1 if self identifies as Hispanic
Unit Deployed 1,0 Value of 1 if at least 30% of unit deployed in any year of first term
Disciplinary Exclusion 1,0 Value of 1 if was exempted from deployment for disciplinary reasons
Dishonorable Discharge 1,0 Value of 1 if dishonorably discharged
Disciplinary Problems 1,0 Value of 1 if disciplinary exclusion or dishonorable discharge
Medical Separations 1,0 Value of 1 if medically separated from service
Low Income 1,0 Value of 1 if income of home zipcode at enlistment is 2 st. devs below average
Change Unit 1,0 Value of 1 if unit changed during first term
Infantry 1,0 Value of 1 if MoS designated as infantry
Other Combat 1,0 Value of 1 if MoS is combat profession other than infantry
Support Job 1,0 Value of 1 if MoS is in a combat support role
Medical Job 1,0 Value of 1 if MoS is in a medical vocation
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We also include data on ‘Military Occupation Specialty’ (MOS), which identifies the specific job
that an individual performs within the military. Service members are generally able to choose their
MOS from a list of options for which they are qualified and for which there is need. This can influence
the likelihood and nature of their deployment in a number of ways. For example, certain specialties –
such as ‘infantry’ – lead to assignments with an extremely high probability of exposure to combat,
while other specialties – such as ‘musician’ – lead to assignments in units that are unlikely to be
exposed to combat.
For simplicity and brevity, we aggregate all MOS designations that involve direct combat engage-
ment with the enemy into two categories: (i) infantry; and (ii) other combat specialties (armor, artillery,
and combat engineering). All non-combat MOSs are divided into three categories – combat support,
medical, and ‘other.’ To be clear, many soldiers holding Non-combat MOS designations were exposed
to combat and served in units that sustained casualties. The distinction is that it is not the job of those
with Non-combat MOSs to engage in combat. Rather, their jobs often lead to being exposed to combat
while fulfilling non-combat missions.5
The data includes annual updates of marital status, number of children, MOS, and age. In most of
our specifications, we use age, marital status, MOS, and a dummy variable for whether or not
someone has children, as of 2001, when our data starts. We include data on an individual’s race
and ethnicity.
As a proxy for intellectual and vocational aptitude, we include percentile scores on the Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT is a subtest of the larger Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and is formed from a composite score of four general areas: arithmetic
reasoning, word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, and mathematics knowledge.
Some of our tests require additional variables. Following Engel, Gallagher, and Lyle (2010) we
code an individual’s unit, at the company level, as deployed if 30% or more of a unit were deployed
while an individual was assigned to that unit.6 We also code dummy variables for whether someone
was dishonorably discharged, medically separated, or ever excluded from deployment for disciplin-
ary reasons. To classify service members according to income, wematched themedian income by zip
code from the 1999 US Census with the zip code of each service member at the time of his
enlistment. We classify someone as low income if they came from a zipcode one standard deviation
below the mean for median income.
Table 2 provides information on AFQT scores, age, race, marital and family status, and whether
individuals or their units were deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The data reveal meaningful differ-
ences in personal characteristics among those who were deployed when compared to those who
Table 2. Descriptive statistics all first term enlisted army personnel.
Variable All Deployed Not deployed Black Not Black
AFQT 59.30984 60.67358 58.7105 51.15563 62.45024
Age 23.83801 24.49776 23.54798 24.00062 23.72949
Marriage 2001 0.236728 0.1940193 0.2555031 0.23417 0.229168
Children 2001 0.208895 0.1691586 0.2263635 0.25656 0.188546
Black 0.22089 0.1886684 0.2351225
Hispanic 0.114527 0.1140199 0.1147505 0.010361 0.067474
Deployed 0.305366 1 0 0.261693 0.319057
Unit Mortality 0.032846 0.1074172 0.0000644 0.022612 0.035805
Medical Seperation 0.079318 0.0586045 0.0884241 0.075092 0.081746
Disciplinary 0.013312 0.0042216 0.0173085 0.018054 0.012182
Dishonorable Disch 0.026642 0.0094987 0.0341788 0.038896 0.023887
Unit 30 percent 0.316852 0.9059807 0.0578668 0.277225 0.329507
Low Income 0.146593 0.1340763 0.1530707 0.242176 0.102583
Change Unit 0.521856 0.8337962 0.3844552 0.51754 0.525112
Infantry 0.153632 0.1498974 0.1552737 0.047967 0.181207
Combat Other 0.136184 0.1301085 0.1388545 0.107837 0.145816
Support Job 0.164348 0.1709176 0.1614599 0.13744 0.175009
Medical Job 0.056552 0.0516271 0.0587174 0.075225 0.048827
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were not. Comparing these subgroups shows that those with higher AFQT scores were more likely to
deploy. Not surprisingly, soldiers who were married, or had children, were also less likely to be
deployed. These differences were large. We also find that those deployed were a year older on
average than the non-deployed.
There are also notable differences among racial groups. Blacks made up 22% of the sample, but
only 19% of those deployed. By comparison, in the 2000 Census, Blacks constituted 14.8% of the 18–
24-year-old population7. Viewed a different way, 26% of Blacks deployed in their first term, while
32% of non-Blacks deployed.
By comparison, Hispanics comprise 11% of the sample, while constituting 17.5% of the 18–24-
year-old population.8 Asch et al. (2009a) find that low Hispanic participation does not reflect any lack
of enthusiasm for military service amongst Hispanic youth, but rather low rates of high school
completion and high rates of obesity.9 Hispanics also constitute 11% of those who were deployed.
Those not deployed had greater separation and discharge rates than those who were deployed.
Table 2 also shows that 90% of those deployed went as part of a unit that was itself deployed. Similarly,
fewer than 6% were left behind in units that were deployed.
This simple cut of the data is sufficient to raise concerns about racial biases. Clearly, a number of
factors connected to underlying demographics shape the likelihood of deployment. Table 2 also
suggests that Black soldiers differ in a variety of observable ways from other soldiers, which suggests
that any meaningful analysis would take these differences into account. Controlling for these factors
requires a multivariate analysis, which we turn to in the next section.
Model for Selection
How does one get sent to a combat zone? How does one end up serving in a unit with combat
deaths? From the point of view of the U.S. Armed Forces, these are not the outcomes of random
processes. Each situation calling for deployment has operational objectives and challenges. Each unit
has different capabilities and different levels of combat readiness. Individuals are deployed with their
units, though not by any means do all members of a unit deploy. The choice of who to send within
a unit creates another level of potentially non-random selection.
The probability that an individual deploys is based on the probability that a unit is sent, the probability
an individual is in that unit, and the probability that an individual is in the fraction of the unit that is sent.
The probability that a unit is sent, while not random, has nothing to do with the individual characteristics
of servicemembers. An airborne unit is sent because an airborne unit is required, not because it hasmore
Hispanics or because fewer married people were assigned to it.
The probability that an individual is in a particular unit is also not random, and may be shaped by
individual decisions. There is a selection based on observable characteristics – such as marriage and
family status – and potentially also on less easily observable characteristics, such as an individual’s
motivation for joining the military in the first place. Helmus et al. (2018) find that the three
motivations most often cited by recruits in explaining their decision to enlist are a desire for
adventure, educational benefits, and patriotism.
Several decisions shape the likelihood of being in a unit that deploys. Joining the Marines, for
example, results in a higher likelihood of deployment that joining one of the other services. Within
the Army, one might expect that joining elite infantry units such as the 82nd Airborne Division and
the Ranger Regiment results in a higher likelihood of deployment that joining other units. Hence,
explicitly asking to ‘go airborne’might get a soldier assigned to a unit that carries a higher chance of
deployment.
Finally, even within units that deploy, some individuals are not sent – potentially as a result of
observable personal characteristics. In our sample, 6% of the non-deployed were in units that were
deployed. Additionally, some individuals were assigned to augment deploying units, even when only
small fractions of their own units deployed. Of personnel who were deployed, 10% were in non-
deployed units. Decisions on who is deployed reflect the commander’s judgement of the readiness
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of individuals to deploy, which may be influenced by marriage and family status, discipline, medical
condition, or myriad other factors.
To sum this up, individual choice of service, MOS, and preference for the type of unit may
influence which unit an individual serves in. Command choices based on operational needs, and
not explicitly on the characteristics of personnel, determine which units are sent. Command deci-
sions based on unit needs and individual characteristics determine who within a unit is sent.10
In order to deepen our understanding of who is deployed and who is not, we estimate logit
regressions in which the main covariates are the observable, predetermined characteristics of
soldiers.11 In Table 3, we report the results of logit analyses of the likelihood of deployment based
on personal characteristics. It also reports the results of logit analyses for the likelihood of being in
a unit that sustains fatalities during its deployment. Once control variables are taken into account,
a much more noticeable selection story appears than what could be identified in the descriptive
statistics.
Unsurprisingly, family concerns lead to a greatly reduced likelihood of deployment. Being married
reduced the odds of deployment by 36%, while having children led to as much as a 35% reduction in
the odds of deployment. Those who are married and have children face about 60% lower odds of
deployment. However, personnel that are married and have children make up less than 20% of
deployable personnel amongst first-term soldiers.
Due to the large size of our samples, even unimportant parameters appear statistically significant.
For example, differences in the average age and AFQT scores are highly significant, but the small
standard deviation in age in most of the sample and the small size of the coefficient on AFQT, make
these unimportant results. A one standard deviation increase in AFQT – about 20 percentage points –
would increase odds of deploying by about 10%.
Of far greater interest, the racial patterns identified in the descriptive statistics grew more
pronounced in the multivariate analysis. Blacks were far less likely than others to deploy, and had
they deployed, they faced up to 26% lower odds of having served in units that sustained fatalities. In
Table 3. Logit all-first term army personnel for probability of deployment and probability of unit experiencing fatalities if
deployed.
Variables Deployment Deployment Deployment Unit mortality Unit mortality Unit mortality
AFQT 1.002*** 1.002*** 1.002*** 0.999 1.001 0.998**
(0.000403) (0.000446) (0.000405) (0.00108) (0.00118) (0.00111)
Age 1.100*** 1.101*** 1.100*** 0.989* 1.004 0.997
(0.00217) (0.00224) (0.00218) (0.00570) (0.00588) (0.00574)
Married 0.635*** 0.648*** 0.633*** 0.829*** 0.889* 0.884*
(0.0137) (0.0143) (0.0137) (0.0531) (0.0588) (0.0576)
Children 0.652*** 0.636*** 0.652*** 0.939 0.934 0.938
(0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0149) (0.0640) (0.0657) (0.0651)
Black 0.770*** 0.847*** 0.763*** 0.738*** 0.977 0.931
(0.0139) (0.0163) (0.0141) (0.0389) (0.0559) (0.0506)
Hispanic 1.071** 1.120*** 1.073** 0.999 1.127 1.093
(0.0328) (0.0352) (0.0330) (0.0791) (0.0924) (0.0878)
Infantry 0.898*** 3.551***
(0.0187) (0.171)
Combat Other 0.928*** 1.736***
(0.0199) (0.0977)
Support Job 1.007 1.570***
(0.0197) (0.0829)
Medical Job 0.788*** 1.490***
(0.0255) (0.132)
Constant 0.0494*** 0.242*** 0.0508*** 0.189*** 0.246*** 0.0994***
(0.00248) (0.0251) (0.00261) (0.0281) (0.0385) (0.0152)
MoS Controls No Yes No No Yes No
100,245 100,227 100,245 30,716 29,942 30,716
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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contrast, Hispanics were significantly more likely to deploy than non-Hispanics, and were as likely as
non-Hispanics to serve in units that sustained fatalities.
We conducted several robustness checks and find that these patterns are consistent across
cohorts and correcting for various fixed effects. In Tables 3 and 4, we also looked at whether MOS
choices would explain deployment patterns. We ran regression with dummy variables for the five
categories of MOSs and with MOS fixed effects. MOS fixed effects reduce, but do not eliminate,
the impact of being Black on the probability of deployment. However, including either MOS
categories or fixed effects renders the impact of being black on unit mortality insignificant in our
sample.
Table 4 replicates models from Table 3 for the pre-9/11 cohort of U.S. Marine Corps (USMC)
enlisted personnel. Blacks were less well represented in the Marines; our analysis shows similar
negative impacts of being Black on the odds of deployment and facing intense combat if deployed
to our analysis of army personnel. Adding MOS categories to the model for the probability of unit
mortality similarly reduces the impact of being black on the probability of unit mortality.
We next examined whether the relationships identified above persist when we examine the sample
of first-term personnel recruited between 2002 and 2005. Table 4 also shows these results and
demonstrates patterns consistent – but attenuated – with those identified above for the pre-9/11
cohort of recruits. In this cohort, adding MOS categories does not eliminate the significant negative
impact of being black on the odds of being in a unit that experiences fatalities.
From this initial look at the results, it appears that race and ethnicity play an important role in
determining whether soldiers will deploy to combat zones. The question is why?
Interunit v. Intraunit Selection for Deployment
There can be only two possible, but not mutually exclusive, explanations for the low deployment
rates observed for soldiers who are married, have children, or are Black. One possibility is that they
are not deploying with their units – intraunit selection. The other is that units with disproportionate
numbers of these types of soldiers are not being deployed as often as other units – interunit
selection.
Some evidence that we have already seen hints that interunit selection is an important driver of
differences in deployment history. First, the preponderance of soldiers deploy with their
units. Second, we have already reported that units that incurred fatalities differed demographically
from units that did not.
Interunit selection requires that soldiers who are married, have children, or are Black, be dis-
proportionately represented in units that are less likely to deploy. How could this be? There is no
explicit or even implicit policy segregating Blacks or those with families into different units.
Oddly enough, however, it isn’t that hard for such segregation to take place. As we mentioned
above, certain types of units are deployed more often than other types of units. It is quite
conceivable that soldiers with families, for example, who hold an infantry MOS disproportionately
prefer to serve in mechanized infantry units rather than airborne units. Airborne units are highly
‘expeditionary’ and are often sent overseas at a moment’s notice to deal with crisis situations.
Soldiers with spouses and children may not find that feature of service as a paratrooper particularly
appealing.
It is not difficult to understand how intraunit selection could also take place either for married
soldiers or those with children. For example, consider a unit commander who has an opportunity to
leave one soldier behind while the rest of the unit deploys (such opportunities occasionally present
themselves). All else equal, the commander might choose to leave a service member with a family
behind.
It is, however, much tougher (and much more important) to understand how either interunit or
intraunit selection could be taking place for Blacks. A more detailed discussion and analysis of this
question is offered below in Section Six of this paper.
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To clarify to what extent interunit and/or intraunit selection account for our results, Table 5 report
the results of a bivariate probit analysis. The two dependent variables are (1) whether a soldier was in
a unit that deployed; and (2) whether a soldier was himself deployed. This allows us to identify intra-
unit and inter-unit selection on observables. The biprobit also explains four possible outcomes: (i) the
soldier’s unit deployed and the soldier was deployed; (ii) the soldier’s unit deployed but the soldier
was not deployed; (iii) the soldier’s unit did not deploy but the soldier was deployed – ostensibly
with another unit; and (iv) neither the unit nor the soldier were deployed. The independent variables
are the same demographic characteristics and MOS categories as in Table 3.
The first two columns in Table 5 are the coefficients of the biprobit regressions. The first column
contains the coefficients for the probability that a soldier’s unit was deployed. The second column
contains the coefficients for the probability of an individual soldier’s deployment. Not surprisingly,
these are not independent of each other and Rho is significant at the 99% level. The coefficients on
the demographic characteristics in both columns are all highly significant, as expected with nearly
30,000 observations. The results clearly indicate that both intraunit and interunit selection took
place, and followed the same demographic patterns.
The next four columns give the marginal effects for the four outcomes. The third column of Table 5
corresponds to a soldier being deployed with his unit. It shows that if a soldier wasmarried, had children,
or was Black, his unit was less likely to be deployed and the soldier himself was less likely to be deployed.
A soldier is 9 percentage points less likely to deploy and be in a deployed unit if he had children,
8 percentage points less likely if he was married, and 5 percentage points less likely if he was Black.
The fourth column shows the effect of demographics on the probability that a soldier was in
a unit that deployed but the soldier did not. As only 6% of our sample was in this group, it is not
surprising that none of the marginal impacts in this column are very large. The fifth column is the
effect of demographics on the probability that a soldier deployed but his unit did not. Again, this is
a small fraction of our sample – only 9%, but consistent, however, with the selection story we see
throughout, married soldiers and Blacks are significantly less likely to find themselves in this group.
The final column is the effect of demographics on both unit and soldier not deploying. Having
children, being married, and being Black, made a soldier far more likely to land in this group.
The biprobit results confirm that personal status, race, and ethnicity play powerful roles in the
placement of personnel into units that were deployed to OEF/OIF. These factors significantly affected
who deployed with their units and who deployed with other units. The fact, however, remains that
a large majority of first-term personnel deployed along with their units. Hence, interunit assignments
were much more important than intraunit deployment decisions.
We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that some of this interunit selection is actually
intraunit sorting driven by pending deployments – more than half of first-term personnel change
units at least once during their first term of enlistment. To clarify this, we looked at the data to see if
there was evidence that certain personnel were being reassigned due to their unsuitability for
deployment. In Table 6, we find that married soldiers, soldiers with children, and Blacks are actually
slightly less rather more likely to be reassigned.
The story of how both intra-unit and inter-unit selection occurs for those with families is an easy
one to tell. But why Blacks are less likely to deploy with their units and why they tend to be assigned
to less deployable units within the same career specialty, remains a mystery. We explore several
possible drivers of this selection story in the next section.
Why Don’t Blacks Deploy?
As we have seen, during the early days of OEF and OIF, Black soldier were less likely to serve in units
that were sent to Afghanistan or Iraq. They were also less likely than others to deploy with the rest of
their unit when serving in units that where assigned to OEF or OIF. And if deployed to OEF or OIF,
they were less likely to be in units that participated in intense combat.
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Given this study’s limitations, we can offer no definitive explanation for the fundamental differ-
ences in the experiences of Blacks who served in the military during the early days of OEF/OIF when
compared with those of other Americans. What we can do is offer several hypotheses and evaluate
their credibility with logic, some statistics, and common sense.
First, the results are consistent with a pattern of systematic institutional bias or discrimination
against Blacks in the US Armed Forces. Burk and Espinoza (2012) review the extensive literature on
this subject, and conclude that there is some evidence of racial bias in the promotion of officers and
the military justice system (while reporting that there was no evidence of bias or discrimination in
recruitment or exposure to combat risks). However, they go on to say with regard to evidence of bias,
that ‘the evidence for each of these claims should not be overstated,' and make clear that these
biases are 'not a direct or intended result of military policy and practice.’12
A second possibility is that the results may be evidence of fundamental differences in the
motives that lead Blacks to join the Armed Forces when compared to other Americans. Ironically,
the idea is that Blacks join the military precisely because it allows them to avoid discrimination that
remains rampant in the civilian labor market. As a result, their motives differ from those of other
recruits and that, in turn, affects the likelihood that they will be deployed to serve in a combat
zone.
There is considerable evidence consistent with this argument. As we mentioned in the introduc-
tion, Blacks who join the military enjoy meaningful financial benefits over their lifetimes, while those
of other ethnic groups do not. Papers that have identified this effect include Ornstein (1976),
Lopreato and Poston (1977), Poston (1979), Berger and Hirsch (1983), Hisnanick (2003), Hirsch and
Mehay (2003), and Kleykamp (2009).
If Blacks who volunteer for military service can expect to enjoy substantially higher incomes, it
would hardly be surprising if a disproportionate number of them were motivated by financial
objectives when they joined the Armed Forces. Others – who could expect no lifetime financial
gain from their service – would be more likely to be motivated by non-pecuniary objectives such as
a desire to experience adventure.
Table 6. Logit all-first term army personnel for probability of reassignment during first-term probablity of
disciplinary problems and medical exclusion.
Variables Change unit Disciplinary problems Medical exclusion
AFQT 1.001 0.992*** 0.993***
(0.000387) (0.000527) (0.000676)
Age 1.181*** 0.915*** 1.036***
(0.00268) (0.00280) (0.00311)
Married 0.689*** 1.036 1.369***
(0.0138) (0.0282) (0.0443)
Children 0.643*** 1.105*** 1.315***
(0.0136) (0.0311) (0.0439)
Black 0.905*** 1.347*** 0.799***
(0.0153) (0.0290) (0.0243)
Hispanic 1.252*** 0.803*** 0.628***
(0.0368) (0.0336) (0.0370)
Infantry 0.636*** 0.883*** 1.102***
(0.0125) (0.0243) (0.0378)
Combat Other 0.769*** 1.060** 0.945
(0.0154) (0.0279) (0.0344)
Support Job 0.883*** 0.972 1.055
(0.0165) (0.0247) (0.0346)
Medical Job 1.055* 0.990 0.967
(0.0321) (0.0414) (0.0512)
Constant 0.0287*** 2.161*** 0.0515***
(0.00159) (0.161) (0.00412)
99,380 100,245 100,245
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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This would explain some of the results that emerged in our analysis. Blacks were disproportio-
nately represented in non-combat professions and Black soldiers were less likely to serve in the most
expeditionary units.
To test the hypothesis that those with more to gain economically from military service were less
likely to deploy than others, we consider whether personnel from low-income backgrounds were less
likely to deploy. Our assumption is that service members from low-income homes are the most likely
to have joined the military for pecuniary reasons.
To classify service members according to income, we matched the median income by zip code
from the 1999 US Census with the zip code of each service member at the time of his enlistment. The
data suggest that Blacks come from markedly poorer neighborhoods on average. Black personnel
come from neighborhoods with median incomes around $37,000-$38,000 while non-Black person-
nel come from neighborhoods with median incomes around $42,000-$43,000.
In Table 7 we report the results from logit regressions on the probability of deployment to test
whether those who came from economically disadvantaged backgrounds were less likely to deploy.
We code a service member as coming from a low-income background if he enlisted from a zip-code
with a median income one standard deviation lower than the mean.
We find evidence that coming from a low-income community reduced one’s likelihood of deploy-
ment. Specifically, a soldier was 5% percent less likely to deploy if he came from a low-income
neighborhood. This impact is significant at the 99% level, but including it in the model of deployment
does not reduce the magnitude of our findings for Blacks. These results do suggest that the enlisted
personnel likely to benefit the most economically from military service were indeed less likely to
deploy.
Table 7. Original regression with added controls.
Variables Deployment Deployment Deployment Deployment
AFQT 1.003*** 1.006*** 1.002*** 1.003***
(0.000444) (0.000435) (0.000409) (0.000477)
Age 1.048*** 1.106*** 1.095*** 1.053***
(0.00233) (0.00236) (0.00220) (0.00252)
Married 0.696*** 0.658*** 0.629*** 0.727***
(0.0167) (0.0157) (0.0137) (0.0191)
Children 0.742*** 0.648*** 0.652*** 0.739***
(0.0187) (0.0163) (0.0150) (0.0205)
Black 0.765*** 0.763*** 0.787*** 0.783***
(0.0153) (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0169)
Hispanic 0.974 1.046 1.053* 0.921**
(0.0325) (0.0339) (0.0326) (0.0324)
Infantry 1.112*** 0.916*** 0.886*** 1.129***
(0.0257) (0.0203) (0.0186) (0.0278)
Combat Other 1.046* 0.886*** 0.936*** 1.036
(0.0246) (0.0199) (0.0202) (0.0256)
Support Job 1.075*** 0.976 1.006 1.076***
(0.0231) (0.0203) (0.0199) (0.0246)
Medical Job 0.731*** 0.869*** 0.783*** 0.791***
(0.0253) (0.0308) (0.0256) (0.0299)
Change Unit 7.671*** 6.480***
(0.136) (0.125)
Low Income 0.932*** 0.949**
(0.0213) (0.0237)




Constant 0.0405*** 0.0428*** 0.0680*** 0.0521***
(0.00233) (0.00237) (0.00356) (0.00323)
Observations 99,380 83,732 100,245 83,166
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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One final possibility was that morale amongst Black troops was lower than that for other service
members during the early days of OEF/OIF. Rohall and Ender (2007) find that Black soldiers simply did
not support the invasion of Iraq to the extent that others did. Hence, Blacks may have been more
likely than others in their units to seek out ways to avoid serving in that conflict. That could plausibly
explain why Blacks were less likely to deploy than others serving alongside them. There is consider-
able evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Asch et al. (2009b) find that ‘the 8.3 percentage point
drop in Black Army representation between the fourth quarters of 2000 and 2004 can be attributed
to a large negative effect of the Iraq war on Black enlistments.’13
Lower morale could also manifest itself in shirking and disciplinary problems – and these in turn
could lead to lower deployability. A 2011 report from the US Army War College raised concerns
about high and growing numbers of soldiers who failed to deploy (Arnold et al. 2011). The report
cited three main reasons why soldiers become undeployable – family status, disciplinary problems,
and medical problems.
Based on this, we explore whether race and ethnicity influence the propensity to experience
disciplinary or medical problems in the US Army. Our data does not specify if someone was non-
deployable for medical reasons. Instead, we used medical dismissals from the military as a proxy for
medical conditions that might prevent deployment. The results, in Table 6, suggest that Blacks and
Hispanics were less likely than Whites to be dismissed from service on medical grounds.
Turning to disciplinary considerations, we looked at the probability that someone had been deemed
un-deployable for disciplinary/legal reasons, to have received a Dishonorable Discharge from service, or
to have otherwise been deemed unfit for service for disciplinary reasons. Table 6 shows that Blacks
were significantly more likely than others to have had these kind of disciplinary problems. Moreover,
including a dummy variable for these disciplinary problems in our Table 3 regressions in Table 7
reduces the impact of being Black slightly on the probability of deployment, suggesting that this effect
is at least partially responsible for Blacks not deploying at the same rate as others.
Finally, in Table 7 we add all of these possible channels and find that it does reduce the impact of
being Black on the probability of deployment slightly, but not enough to suggest that we can explain it
away.
Conclusion
Black soldiers were much less likely to serve in units that were sent to Afghanistan or Iraq. They were
much less likely than others to deploy with their comrades when serving in units that where assigned
to OEF or OIF. If deployed to OEF or OIF, they were less likely to be in units that participated in intense
combat. And they were more likely to be excluded from deployment due to disciplinary infractions
or face dishonorable discharges.
It is impossible not to conclude that, even 70 years after the end of segregation in the US Armed
Forces, what Blacks experience while serving in the military still differs radically from that of all other
Americans who don uniforms. Given the important role that military service plays in enculturation
and the forming of social identity amongst veterans – and the large number of young people of all
races who serve in the US military – these findings should be of considerable concern.
Notes
1. See https://www.theatlantic.com/ideastour/military/moskos-full.html.
2. See http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2005/ArmyRecruitmentGoals End angeredas Percent of African
American Enlistees Declines .aspx.
3. See http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25809737/ns/us_news-life/t/after-years-black-military-officers-rare/.
4. Table 4 replicates our models in Table 3 for the Marines and the Army cohort that enlisted between 2002 to
2005.
5. In Table 3, we include fixed effects for each Combat and Non-Combat MOS.
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6. For robustness, we also ran the analysis with a threshold of 60% but the results are largely unchanged, which is
unsurprising given that units typically deploy around 80% of their personnel.
7. see http://www.infoplease.com/us/census/data/demographics and https://www.census.gov/prod/2001/pubs/
c2kbr01-12.pdf for underlying data.
8. see http://www.infoplease.com/us/census/data/demographics and https://www.census.gov/prod/2001/pubs/
c2kbr01-12.pdf for underlying data.
9. Asch et al. (2009a), xvii.
10. As part of this study, we spoke with several dozen military officers assigned to the Naval Postgraduate School as
students or faculty regarding their experiences as company commanders preparing for deployment.
11. We show our result in terms of odds ratios to make interpretation easier. Odds ratios for categorical variables
show the difference in odds for an outcome for the categorical variable in question relative to the base, or the
percentage change in odds for a one-unit increase in a continuous variable. For example, an odds ratio of 1.09
represents a 9% increase in odds of deployment.
12. See Burk and Espinoza (2012), 401.
13. Asch et al. (2009b), xix.
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